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Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-FAILURE TO APPOINT COUNSEL ON
DIsCRnoNARY APPEALS HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
Ross v. Moffitt, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974).
An indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution is guaranteed the
right to appointed counsel.1 The boundaries of this right, however, have yet
to be fully developed. 2 For instance, the right to counsel on appeal has
developed in stages. Initially, the indigent criminal defendant successfully
attacked state statutes establishing filing fees or other financial prerequi-
sites which denied him access to the appellate level. 3 Soon the Supreme
Court clarified its position on such discriminatory statutes by specifically
1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This right to counsel provision was applied to the states through the use of the fourteenth
amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court stated that in many of
its decisions the principle had developed that the right to counsel is fundamental to ordered
justice and therefore obligatory upon the states. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
All states have within their own constitutions today, a right to counsel provision. In Vir-
ginia, no person shall be ". . . deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land ... "
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8. This clause has been held to confer the right to counsel. Stonebreaker
v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
2. In determining the scope of this right the Supreme Court has generally been asked either
to extend it to a certain type of criminal defendant or to declare an allegedly critical stage of
the proceeding within the purview of the amendment. For the development of the right to
counsel with respect to the particular type of defendant, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (misdemeanants); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquents); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felons); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (capital
offenders).
The Court has decided that a suspect has the right to counsel as early as the custodial
interrogation stage. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The convicted criminal defen-
dant enjoys the right to appointed counsel on some appeals and post-conviction proceedings.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (revocation of probation and imposition of deferred
sentencing); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (appeals of right). Cf. Abraham v.
Wainwright, 407 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1969) (not extended to appeals from denial of motion to
vacate judgment). Many cases have declared in general terms that the right to counsel on
appeal extends to every stage of the proceeding. See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
3. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Court held that when appeals are made
available, all defendants must have an adequate opportunity to present their claims of error.
An adequate opportunity meant at least the opportunity to file claims of error despite an
inability to pay certain fees. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id. at 19.
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extending the right to proceed in forma pauperis to discretionary appeals.4
The indigent attempted to extend the Court's reasoning in the filing fee
cases to establish the right of counsel on appeal, contending that the mere
elimination of filing fees did not provide meaningful access to the courts.
When the Supreme Court decided that meaningful access did include the
right to counsel on an indigent's first appeal as a matter of right,5 it became
obvious that whether the state also had a duty to appoint counsel on the
discretionary appellate level would also be tested.
In Ross v. Moffitt,' the Supreme Court was asked to take the final step
and to impose such a duty upon the states. The case was a consolidation
of two criminal convictions.' On separate appeals of right,' Moffitt, an
indigent represented by court-appointed counsel, had received affirmances
of his convictions. Following the affirmance of one conviction Moffitt was
denied the aid of appointed counsel in perfecting an appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, which had the power of discretionary review?
Moffitt was, however, granted counsel to prepare his petition for certiorari
to the North Carolina Supreme Court following his second conviction, but
4. The Court in Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959), said:
This principle [of giving the indigent an adequate opportunity to appeal] is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency.
Accord, Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960) (per curiam). The federal courts and most state
courts now have the authority by statute to grant appeals in forma pauperis upon the indi-
gent's filing of an affidavit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 17-30.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1974).
5. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the defendants had been denied counsel
to prosecute their first appeal of right from thirteen felony convictions because the court of
appeals believed it would not be to their advantage to have such assistance. The Supreme
Court of the United States held, however, that an appeal as a matter of right is meaningless
when a defendant is forced to show the merit of his appeal without the benefit of counsel.
The presence of counsel was essential to any meaningful access to the appellate courts, so
that any statute which made the appointment of counsel discretionary was unconstitutional.
6. 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974).
7. Moffitt was charged in both instances with the felony of forgery and uttering forged
instruments; he pleaded not guilty.
8. In all criminal cases except those involving a sentence of death or life imprisonment,
an appeal as a matter of right lies first to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1973). A defendant has another appeal of right to the North
Carolina Supreme Court if the case involves a constitutional question, or if there is a dissent
in the court below. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1969).
9. Except for appeals falling under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1973), and N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1969), the review of the supreme court is on a discretionary basis. The
method used in seeking such an appeal is a petition for certiorari. State v. Williams, 274 N.C.
328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968).
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the court denied certiorari." This denial prompted a petition by Moffitt
for court-appointed counsel to prepare a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. Again, Moffitt was denied assistance from the
state."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted Moffitt habeas
corpus relief, holding that the fourteenth amendment requires the state to
provide counsel for an indigent defendant who seeks discretionary review
by the state supreme court, and also when an indigent petitions the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 2 On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed 3 and separately disposed of the respondent's equal protec-
tion and due process arguments. 4
10. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971). In cases which do not qualify for
mandatory appointment of counsel under N.C. GEN STAT. § 7A-451(b)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1973),
the court may appoint counsel in its own discretion.
11. 94 S. Ct. at 2441.
12. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973). The court stated that a reasonable
interpretation of North Carolina's statutory provision at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(b)(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1973), would provide the indigent with counsel on any appeal. However, since
the state interpreted the statute narrowly, Moffitt v. Blackledge, 341 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.C.
1972), the Fourth Circuit in its habeas jurisdiction found that the failure to appoint counsel
on discretionary appeals violated the Federal Constitution. The court stated that "[tihe
same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require
counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals." 483 F.2d at 655. The court found that
the failure to appoint counsel on discretionary appeals, denied the indigent meaningful access
because the quality of justice had been substantially impaired. 483 F.2d at 653.
13. By reversing Ross the Supreme Court overruled sub silentio a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973), the court
held that although an indigent defendant who had been denied counsel had not been barred
from prosecuting a discretionary appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, as in the filing fee
cases, he was so seriously disadvantaged in comparison to a wealthy defendant with retained
counsel that his right to fair procedure and equal protection had been violated. The court
considered the factors stated in Douglas and determined that the benefit of an attorney's
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of the arguments on his
client's behalf was too necessary to a meaningful appeal to be a function of the defendant's
financial status.
One of the government's primary arguments in the case was that providing counsel on the
first appeal is all that is required by the fourteenth amendment. The court in Mitchell
responded by citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), wherein the Supreme Court refused
the same argument made in an attempt to justify a filing fee requirement in order to appeal.
The court in Mitchell also dismissed the state's contention that practical considerations and
institutional limitations compelled a finding against the indigent. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Cf. Brief for Virginia as Amicus
Curiae, Ross v. Moffitt, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974).
14. The Supreme Court found the same reasons for denying relief that the Seventh Circuit
had in Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
In Pennington, the court also noted that the factors considered in granting or denying certior-
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that despite the
Court's decisions invalidating financial barriers" and demanding compe-
tent representation"6 in the appellate process, the due process clause is not
violated by the denial of counsel on appeal because the state need not
provide any appeal at all.' 7 He concluded that if appeals are made avail-
able and counsel denied, the issue of constitutionality is better framed in
an equal protection context.'8 The Court pointed out, however, that the
equal protection clause does not demand perfect equality of treatment,'"
and that alternate methods which are not discriminatory may be applied
to criminal defendants. 21 Only when the indigent defendant is denied
meaningful access to the appellate system has his right to equal protection
been violated.2'
ari to the Illinois Supreme Court are much like those considered by the United States Su-
preme Court. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 315. The court attempted to justify its decision by confess-
ing an inability to require the state to appoint counsel on discretionary appeals when the
highest court in the nation does not appoint counsel for defendants appealing from its courts
of appeals. But cf. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970); FED. R. Cram.
P. 44(a). In Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28, 36 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), it was
stated that under this Act, the federal courts of appeal must appoint counsel for federal
indigent defendants seeking a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
15. See notes 3-4 supra. See also Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971) (per curiam); Draper
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967).
17. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
18. 94 S. Ct. at 2444.
19. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Rodriguez, the Court stated that ". . . at least where wealth
is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages." 411 U.S. at 24.
20. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
21. In Douglas, the Court found that an indigent did not have meaningful access when on
his first appeal of right, he was denied counsel. See note 5 supra. See also Boskey, The Right
to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1961). Based on information
gathered from judges, court officials, and colleagues at the bar, Mr. Boskey concluded that
assistance of counsel was particularly essential to meaningful access to the appellate process
when the review was on a discretionary basis.
[Ildentifying the appellate issues in a criminal case and presenting them to the court
of appeals clearly requires the professional talents of a lawyer. In certain respects this
is even more true in connection with preparing a petition for certiorari, the aim of
which is to persuade the Supreme Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Id.
at 797.
But see Comment, Post-Conviction Due Process, 55 MICH. L. REV. 413, 420 (1957). "[The
presence of counsel is not a sine qua non to access to the courts, as was the availability of
the transcript in the Griffin case."
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In assessing the substance of a discretionary appeal without counsel, the
Court observed that an indigent defendant in states having an intermedi-
ate court of appeals has already been represented by counsel on his appeal
as a matter of right.? The indigent seeking discretionary review was said
to have the benefit of "... at the very least, a transcript or other record
of the trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting
forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of
Appeals disposing of his case."' Thus, the Court concluded that a defen-
dant denied counsel on a discretionary appeal is far less handicapped than
the defendant denied counsel on his appeal of right.21 The test in Ross
required only that the state's refusal to appoint counsel must not consti-
tute a denial of meaningful access to the courts, and the Court concluded
that North Carolina's appellate procedure satisfied this test.?
The Court attempted to bolster its decision by further relying on the
procedural characteristics of the North Carolina appellate process. In mak-
ing the determination whether to grant or deny certiorari, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina weighs such factors as the degree of public interest
in the subject matter, whether there are legal principles involved of major
significance to the state, and whether the lower appellate court's decision
appears to be in conflict with a prior decision of the supreme court.2 8 The
Court considered the handicap of petitioning without counsel less pro-
nounced when the state supreme court's determination is based on these
grounds, rather than the correctness of the lower court's holding.?
The respondent's contention that counsel must be appointed to prepare
a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was also struck
down.? The Court supplemented its reasons for denying counsel on state
discretionary appeals by noting that Congress has enacted statutes which
provide for discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court.2 9 It
would therefore be less reasonable for the state to be required to appoint
counsel for a defendant seeking an appeal created by federal statute, than
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(b)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
23. 94 S. Ct. at 2446.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 2447.
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1969). As evidenced by the granting of certiorari after
the Mecklenburg conviction in Ross and the denial of certiorari after the Guilford conviction,
the grant or denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of
the case. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).
Denial of the writ means only that in the opinion of the supreme court the case does not
require further review under the statutory provision.
27. 94 S. Ct. at 2446.
28. Id. at 2447.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970).
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it would be for the United States Supreme Court to make such an appoint-
ment." The Court has consistently refused the latter proposal. '
It is submitted that the Court in Ross failed to adequately explain why
the concepts of fairness and equality, which demand appointed counsel on
appeals of right, do not require counsel on subsequent discretionary ap-
peals. 32 The Court discounted the importance on any appeal of having a
skilled advocate who can present the issues clearly and persuasively to the
court. Without defining the term, the Court concluded that meaningful
access to the state supreme courts is achieved by the mere existence of the
barren testimony and briefs from the court below. Although the Court
was on firm ground in refusing to apply an extremely exacting test,' it is
questionable how, in light of the cases declaring the importance of the right
to counsel,36 the Court could dismiss this right as an inconsequential ad-
vantage when sought on discretionary appeals.
30. 94 S. Ct. at 2447. See Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
863 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U.S. 819 (1963); Mooney v. New York, 373
U.S. 947 (1963).
32. The Court in Douglas failed to reach the issue of whether a defendant who is refused
counsel on a discretionary appeal was denied meaningful access, but the Sixth Circuit, when
faced with this issue, determined that the permissiveness of the appeal had no effect on
counsel's impact towards gaining meaningful access to the court. See note 13 supra. This
decision by the Sixth Circuit was not even referred to in the Court's opinion in Ross. The
Court in Ross failed to consider, as did the Sixth Circuit, one of the main factors which
influenced the decision in Douglas, i.e., that when the indigent appeals without counsel, and
".. .the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, [he] has only the right to a meaningless
ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal." 372 U.S. at 357-58. This element of
inequality is present on any appeal.
33. See note 21 supra.
34. 94 S. Ct. at 2446.
35. Since there was neither a fundamental right nor suspect classification involved, the
strict scrutiny test did not apply. Wealth was specifically denied recognition as a suspect
classification in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Under
the strict scrutiny test the state must show a compelling interest in maintaining its practice
and that there is no less harmful alternative available. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972). The Court in Ross did have the opportunity to review the state's practice with a high
degree of sensitivity, since there was a wealth classification and the right to counsel is at least
a very important right. See generally Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model of a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). For a case which
arguably applies this level of scrutiny see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The
Court in Ross, however, reviewed the case under a test of minimum rationality, which re-
quires only that there be a reasonable relationship between the state's means and the ends
sought. The Court by using this test, found it reasonable for the state to deny Moffitt's request
for counsel on discretionary appeal. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 481 (1963).
36. See notes 2, 4, 5 supra.
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The Ross opinion presents another question. By exclusively assessing the
disadvantages of discretionary appeal without counsel under a state appel-
late structure having an intermediate court of appeals, and by relying on
the North Carolina standard for discretionary review, the Supreme Court
arguably left open the question of whether the fourteenth amendment is
violated when the only appeal an indigent has is discretionary,37 and coun-
sel is denied. Virginia is one of the majority of states which has no interme-
diate appellate court,3 but only Virginia and West Virginia fail to provide
an appeal of right to the state supreme court in felony cases. The proce-
dure in Virginia is similar to North Carolina in that most appellate review
in the supreme court is discretionary." Virginia has, however, by statute
provided counsel at least for a felon who seeks discretionary review in the
supreme court,41 and the Virginia Supreme Court has held this statutory
requirement to be demanded by the fourteenth amendment.42 Ross would
seem to invalidate Virginia's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's
demands, unless the unique nature of discretionary review in Virginia
makes the Ross decision inapplicable. 43 Since the Virginia Supreme Court
37. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-123 (Cum. Supp. 1974), 19.1-282 (1960), wherein the circuit
courts are given original jurisdiction over felonies with a writ of error lying from the circuit
courts to the supreme court.
38. Brief for Respondent at 9 n.5, Ross v. Moffitt, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974).
39. Breen, Solutions for Appellate Court Congestion, 47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 228, 233 (1964).
40. For the only occasions in which there is an appeal of right to the Virginia Supreme
Court, see VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-39 (1973) (decisions of the State Corporation Commission);
Id. at § 54-74(5) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (disbarment proceedings).
41. It is unclear which section of the Code embodies the right of the indigent felon to
representation by counsel on his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. In VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-241.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974), the indigent is granted counsel to assist at ". . . every stage
of the legal proceeding against him." The Virginia Supreme Court in Cabaniss v. Cun-
ningham, 206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965), implied that the predecessor to the clause above
included both appeals of right and discretionary appeals. Yet, the indigent felon is specifically
granted assistance of counsel on petition for writ of error to the Virginia Supreme Court by
VA. CODE ANN. § 17-30.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.8 (Cum. Supp.
1974), where the provision for counsel for the misdemeanant is phrased only in the general
language quoted above. The question arises whether the absence of a specific section of the
Code regarding counsel for indigent misdemeanants on discretionary appeals, while making
such a provision for felons, discloses an unequal treatment which is constitutionally imper-
missible. See Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).
42. Cabaniss v. Cunningham, 206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965) (defendant was a felon
seeking discretionary review). The court said:
It is well settled that the failure to appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant in
making an appeal from a conviction is a denial of equal protection and due process
guaranteed him under the Federal Constitution and the Virginia Bill of Rights. Id. at
333, 143 S.E.2d at 913.
Accord, Smith v. Peyton, 207 Va. 515, 151 S.E.2d 382 (1966) (per curiam); Thacker v. Peyton,
206 Va. 771, 146 S.E.2d 176 (1966).
43. It is true that the factors considered in granting and denying review vary greatly in the
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has stated unequivocally that the decision to grant or deny a writ of error
is based solely on the case's merits,"4 it seems quite possible that the denial
of a writ of error, in fact is an affirmance of the decision below." The denial
of a writ of certiorari, on the other hand, may reflect merely the social
importance of the case." The Court in Ross gave no indication whether,
by holding that counsel may be denied on discretionary appeals, this was
meant to include a state like Virginia in which a defendant has had no
previous appeal and the determination to grant or deny review is based
solely on the merits.
G.W.P.
North Carolina Supreme Court and the Virginia Supreme Court. In North Carolina, review
is by writ of certiorari as in the United States Supreme Court, while in Virginia review is by
writ of error. Compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953) (concurring opinion), wherein
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that ". . . our denial of certiorari in the ordinary run of cases
can be [for] any number of things other than a decision on the merits. . ." with Saunders
v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 703, 204 S.E.2d 421, 425 (1974), wherein the Virginia Supreme Court
stated that "... error is granted or refused is determined by. . . the merit or lack of merit
of the particular case." Id. at 913.
44. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974). In this case the petitioner
contended that the court's decision to grant or deny certiorari had shifted from a determina-
tion on the merits to one based upon social importance and thereby resulted in unequal
treatment of defendants who were similarly situated. The court answered by stating unequi-
vocally that the determination was based solely on the merits of the case, and that when
doubt exists as to the propriety of the decision below, the court must grant the writ of error.
Accord, McCue v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 870, 49 S.E. 623 (1905).
45. See BuRKs PLEADING & PRAcTICE § 435 (4th ed. 1952); Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice:
A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. Rav. 3, 14 (1971). Denial of a writ of certiorari is not, however,
necessarily an affirmance of the decision below. See also note 42 supra.
46. See note 43 supra.
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